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Note 
FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.: DIRTY WORDS AND 
MESSY LOGIC—THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO FIX 
BROADCAST MEDIA REGULATION 
EDWARD J. REILLY* 
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court of the 
United States considered whether the Federal Communication 
Commission‘s (―FCC‖) new policy allowing sanctions on fleeting and 
isolated expletives was arbitrary and capricious pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (―APA‖).2  The Court held that the FCC 
provided a reasoned basis and explanation for its new policy and therefore 
ruled that the policy was not arbitrary and capricious.3  In finding that the 
FCC‘s new policy was not arbitrary and capricious, the Court failed to 
require the FCC to sufficiently explain why its longstanding policy was no 
longer adequate.4   
In addition, the Court erred in accepting the FCC‘s unreasonable 
reliance on outdated and anachronistic precedents such as Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC5
 
and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,6 cases that 
relied on circumstances of broadcast media that no longer apply, to justify 
the FCC‘s unique regulations on broadcast media.7  Furthermore, the Court 
failed to review and invalidate the FCC‘s enforcement regime on 
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1. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
 2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 3. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1812. 
 4. See infra Part V.A. 
 5. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 6. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 7. See infra Part V.B. 
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constitutional grounds despite the fact that its regime is based on unsound 
and invalid constitutional precedents.8  
I.  THE CASE 
Bono, lead singer of the band U2, exclaimed, ―‗This is really, really, 
f[******] brilliant,‘‖ as he accepted a Golden Globe Award during NBC‘s 
live broadcast of the event on January 19, 2003.9  Despite allegations from 
the Parents Television Council that the broadcast was obscene and indecent 
under FCC regulations, the Enforcement Bureau of the FCC (―Bureau‖) 
denied the complaints on the basis that the speech was neither obscene nor 
indecent, in part because ―the utterance was fleeting and isolated.‖10  Five 
months later, the full Commission reversed the Bureau‘s decision in its 
Golden Globes Order, ruling that any use of the ―F-word‖ inherently had 
sexual connotation and, in contrast to prior FCC decisions, isolated or 
fleeting broadcasts of the ―F-word‖ or similar utterances would henceforth 
be indecent and therefore actionable.11   
Although NBC, Fox, and Viacom, Inc. raised a variety of challenges to 
the Golden Globes Order, the FCC has yet to address the complaints while 
this policy remains in place.12  The present case concerns a series of 
utterances during live broadcasts aired by Fox Television Stations, Inc. 
(―Fox‖) between 2002 and 2003.  On February 21, 2006, the FCC issued an 
order (―Omnibus Order‖) addressing various complaints against networks, 
including Fox, that were responsible for broadcasts actionable under its new 
policy.13  One incident occurred during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, 
 
 8. See infra Part V.C. 
 9. In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
―Golden Globe Awards‖ Program (Golden Globes Order), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4975, 4976 n.4 
(2004). 
 10. Id. at 4975–76.  
 11. Id. at 4978–80. 
 12. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 
1800 (2009).  The major broadcast networks challenged the FCC‘s new policy on multiple 
grounds.  They argued that the new rule represents a ―zero-tolerance‖ policy that contradicts the 
bedrock First Amendment principle that speakers have ―‗breathing space.‘‖  Brief of Petitioner 
CBS Broad., Inc. at 13, Fox, 489 F.3d 44 (No. 06-1760-ag(L)), 2006 WL 4900577.  The networks 
also argued that the FCC‘s decision violated due process and was arbitrary and capricious in 
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.  Id.  In addition, they suggested that the FCC‘s 
decision created a new definition of the word ―‗profane‘‖ that Congress did not approve and 
argued that the FCC policy failed to justify such a dramatic change in policy regarding isolated 
expletives.  Brief for Intervenors NBC Universal, Inc. & NBC Telemundo License Co. at 22–23, 
Fox, 489 F.3d 44 (No. 06-1760-AG), 2006 WL 5100107.  The networks also suggested that less 
restrictive means are available to accomplish the FCC‘s aims.  Id. at 23–24. 
 13. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 
and March 8, 2005 (Omnibus Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2665 (2006).  The FCC dismissed 
complaints against ABC and CBS on remand.  In re Complaints Regarding Various Television 
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when the singer Cher exclaimed, ―‗People have been telling me I‘m on the 
way out every year, right?  So f[***] ‗em.‘‖14  The second incident 
occurred during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards in a segment featuring 
Nicole Richie, who asked the audience, ―Why do they even call it ‗The 
Simple Life‘?  Have you ever tried to get cow s[***] out of a Prada purse?  
It‘s not so f[******] simple.‖15  The FCC found the language in these two 
incidents to be actionably indecent.16 
Fox and CBS sought judicial review of the Omnibus Order by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and ABC filed a 
petition for review in the D.C. Circuit.17  ABC‘s petition was transferred to 
the Second Circuit and consolidated with the petition filed by Fox and 
CBS.18  Before any briefing, the FCC obtained a voluntary remand from the 
Second Circuit to allow the networks to air their objections.19  On remand, 
however, the FCC upheld the indecency findings for the Fox broadcasts.20 
In its Remand Order,
 
the FCC found that the 2003 Billboard Music 
Awards incident was actionably indecent, both under its old policy and its 
new policy announced in the Golden Globes Order, because the potentially 
offensive material was ―‗repeated‘‖ and because Nicole Richie used ―two 
extremely graphic and offensive words‖ that were ―deliberately uttered.‖21  
The FCC acknowledged, however, that at the time of the broadcast of 
Cher‘s comment in 2002, it was not apparent from the FCC‘s stated policies 
or precedent that Fox could be penalized.22  Although the FCC previously 
gave immunity to isolated indecent expletives, such as those uttered by 
Cher and Nicole Ritchie,23 the FCC claimed that this practice rested upon 
staff rulings and dicta rather than binding precedent.24  Thus, the FCC 
rejected such staff rulings and dicta and affirmed the appropriateness of its 
 
Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005 (Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13,299, 
13,299 (2006).  
 14. Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2690. 
 15. Id. at 2693 n.164. 
 16. Id. at 2691, 2694. 
 17. Fox, 489 F.3d at 453. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13,299, 13,299 (2006).   
 21. Id. at 13,307–08. 
 22. Id. at 13,324. 
 23. Id. at 13,308 (reiterating the position articulated in the Golden Globes Order that isolated 
and fleeting expletives are actionable and disavowing prior agency dicta to the contrary).  
 24. Id. at 13,306 (―Fox‘s argument that a ‗fleeting and isolated utterance‘ is not actionably 
indecent is based largely on staff letters and dicta in decisions predating the Commission‘s Golden 
Globe Awards Order.‖). 
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new policy, first articulated in the Golden Globes Order, holding that 
fleeting and isolated expletives could be actionably indecent.25  
The FCC declined to order any forfeitures or sanctions on Fox,26 but 
the television network, along with CBS and NBC, sought review of the 
Remand Order by the Second Circuit.27  The Court of Appeals reversed the 
agency‘s Remand Order, finding that the FCC‘s policy regarding ―‗fleeting 
expletives‘‖ represented a ―significant departure from positions previously 
taken by the agency and relied on by the broadcast industry.‖28  The court 
also held that the agency failed to articulate a reasoned basis for its new 
policy and did not properly address constitutional challenges raised by the 
networks.29  Therefore, the court reasoned that the FCC‘s new policy was 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA.30  Because the court vacated the 
FCC‘s order on APA grounds, it did not reach the other challenges raised 
by petitioners, intervenors, and amici.31
  
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide 
whether the FCC‘s decision, and the reasoning behind it, violated the 
APA‘s prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action.32 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Communications Act of 1934 first established the FCC and its 
ability to regulate broadcast media.33  In 1978, the Supreme Court 
cemented the FCC‘s authority to regulate indecent broadcasts in FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation.34  Since then, the FCC has been committed to a 
narrow enforcement regime that does not issue sanctions for isolated and 
fleeting expletives.35  The restrictions on broadcast media have been based 
 
 25. Id. at 13,307. 
 26. Id. at 13,321–26. 
 27. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 
1800 (2009). 
 28. Id. at 446–47.  Although the FCC suggested several independent rationales for the new 
policy, the court determined that the reasons were neither logical nor based on factual 
considerations that existed at the time of the prior policy‘s formation and therefore did not justify 
a new policy.  Id. at 458–62. 
 29. Id. at 447, 467.  The court shared concerns raised by the networks that the new policy was 
unconstitutionally vague, gave too much discretion to government officials, was inconsistent with 
Supreme Court decisions on indecency, and was based on outdated factual considerations 
surrounding televised broadcasts.  Id. at 462–66. 
 30. Id. at 446–47. 
 31. Id.; see also supra note 12 (discussing other challenges raised). 
 32. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1805. 
 33. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).  
 34. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 35. See infra Part II.A. 
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on the unique factual circumstances surrounding broadcast media since its 
inception, and therefore these restrictions have not been imposed on other 
forms of media.36
 
 In formulating or changing its policies, the FCC must 
provide adequate justifications for its policy decisions to satisfy the APA‘s 
―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard of review.37  Furthermore, although the 
Supreme Court had traditionally sought to avoid addressing constitutional 
issues if it could resolve a case without doing so, the Court recently 
demonstrated a willingness to ignore this practice under certain 
circumstances.38 
A. The FCC Traditionally Has Not Found Isolated and Fleeting 
Expletives to Be Actionable 
The Communications Act of 1934 created the FCC and granted the 
agency the authority to regulate broadcast as a check against the chaos of 
unregulated broadcast.39  In the 1978 Pacifica decision, the Supreme Court 
cemented the FCC‘s narrow authority to regulate indecent speech under 
certain circumstances.40  After Pacifica, the FCC remained committed to a 
narrow understanding of its authority to regulate indecent speech, 
specifically exempting isolated and fleeting expletives.41  Even as the FCC 
sought to expand its authority to regulate indecent speech, it continued to 
provide a safe harbor for isolated and fleeting expletives.42  
1.  The FCC’s Authority to Regulate Indecency on Broadcast 
Mediums Stems from the Communications Act of 1934 
The Communications Act of 193443 created the FCC by centralizing 
several authorities44 and granted the FCC regulatory authority over 
interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication.45  The 
Act authorized the FCC to establish a system of broadcast licenses to 
―maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio 
 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
 37. See infra Part II.C. 
 38. See infra Part II.D. 
 39. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 40. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 41. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 42. See infra Part II.A.4. 
 43. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–614 (2006). 
 44. Id. § 151 (centralizing authority previously held by several wire and radio agencies into 
the FCC). 
 45. Id.  
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transmission.‖46  These licenses grant a broadcaster an exclusive part of the 
public domain and, along with it, enforceable public obligations.47  One 
such obligation is the prohibition against ―utter[ing] any obscene, indecent, 
or profane language by means of radio communication.‖48 
2. Historically, the FCC Has Not Found Isolated and Fleeting 
Expletives to Be Actionably Indecent 
The first significant challenge to the FCC‘s broadcast regulations 
related to indecency was the 1978 case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, in 
which the Supreme Court upheld the FCC‘s decision to sanction indecent 
broadcast, but emphasized the narrow nature of the ruling and did not 
declare that isolated and fleeting expletives were actionably indecent.49  In 
that case, a New York radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation played 
comedian George Carlin‘s twelve-minute monologue entitled Filthy Words 
around 2:00 p.m.50  After receiving a complaint regarding the broadcast, the 
FCC ―issued a declaratory order granting the complaint and holding that 
Pacifica ‗could have been the subject of administrative sanctions.‘‖51  The 
FCC found the power to sanction broadcasters in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which 
forbids the use of ―any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of 
radio communication.‖52  The FCC argued that Carlin‘s monologue fit 
within the scope of ―‗indecent‘‖ language because it included certain words 
that depicted sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive 
manner.53
 
 The FCC also found that the timing and manner of the broadcast 
supported its decision, noting that the monologue was ―broadcast at a time 
when children were undoubtedly in the audience,‖ and that the offensive 
language was ―repeated over and over‖ and ―deliberately broadcast.‖54   
 
 46. Id. § 301. 
 47. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).  The FCC revised its regulations to permit the broadcasting of 
indecent material between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.  Action for Children‘s Television 
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 49. 438 U.S. 726, 750–51 (1978). 
 50. Id. at 729–30.  
 51. Id. at 730 (quoting In re Citizen‘s Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI 
(FM), 32 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1331, 1337 (1975)).  The complaint was made by a man who 
―stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son, [and] wrote a letter 
complaining to the Commission.‖  Id.    
 52. 18 U.S.C § 1464.  The statute provides for a fine of not more than $10,000 or 
imprisonment not more than two years, or both.  Id.  
 53. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732. 
 54. In re Citizen‘s Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 32 Rad. Reg. 
2d (P & F) at 1337. 
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The D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC‘s decision,55 and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the language was indecent and 
whether the order violated the First Amendment.56
 
 The FCC clearly stated 
in its brief to the Supreme Court that its ruling was intended to narrowly 
apply only to the facts of Carlin‘s monologue during the daytime 
broadcast.57  As a result, the Supreme Court confined its review to facts of 
Carlin‘s monologue rather than undertaking a broader review of the FCC‘s 
authority in similar situations.58 
The Supreme Court, reversing the circuit court‘s decision,59 held that 
the FCC was permitted to sanction indecent speech without showing that it 
satisfied the elements of obscenity.60  The Court also ruled that broadcast 
communication received the least amount of First Amendment protection of 
all forms of communication because it is ―uniquely pervasive . . . in the 
lives of all Americans‖ and is ―uniquely accessible to children.‖61 
The Court went to great lengths to emphasize the narrowness of the 
ruling, noting specifically that this decision does not address whether ―an 
occasional expletive . . . would justify any sanction.‖62  Justices Powell and 
Blackmun, the two concurring Justices who supplied the votes necessary for 
the 5-4 decision, also expressed the narrowness of their review.63
 
 They 
pressed this point, noting that the ―Commission‘s holding, and certainly the 
 
 55. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (―As we find that the 
Commission‘s Order is in violation of its duty to avoid censorship of radio communications . . . 
we must reverse the Order.‖), rev’d, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 56. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734 (granting certiorari on the following issues: (1) whether the 
scope of judicial review encompassed more than the Commission‘s determination that the 
monologue was indecent as broadcast; (2) whether the Commission‘s order was a form of 
censorship forbidden by Communications Act of 1934 § 326; (3) whether the broadcast was 
indecent within the meaning of Communications Act of 1934 § 1464; and (4) whether the order 
violates the First Amendment). 
 57. Brief of FCC at 42, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (No. 77-529), 1978 WL 206838 (―[T]he 
Commission‘s decision must be read narrowly, limited to the language ‗as broadcast‘ in the early 
afternoon. . . .  The Commission believes its order should have been read narrowly and reviewed 
as an ad hoc ruling.‖).  
 58. See supra text accompanying note 49 (emphasizing the narrowness of the Court‘s 
review); see also infra text accompanying notes 62–64. 
 59. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief Justice Burger 
and Justice Rehnquist with Justice Powell and Justice Blackmun concurring in the judgment.  
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726–29. 
 60. Id. at 740–41. 
 61. Id. at 748–49. 
 62. Id. at 750. 
 63. Id. at 755–56 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (―The Court 
today reviews only the Commission‘s holding that Carlin‘s monologue was indecent ‗as 
broadcast‘ at two o‘clock in the afternoon, and not the broad sweep of the Commission‘s 
opinion.‖).  
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Court‘s holding today, does not speak to cases involving the isolated use of 
a potentially offensive word in the course of a radio broadcast.‖64 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on the grounds 
that the plurality‘s justifications suffered from a ―lack of principled 
limitation on their use as a basis for FCC censorship.‖65  Justice Brennan 
also noted that ―[n]o such limits come readily to mind, and neither of the 
opinions constituting the Court serve to clarify the extent to which the FCC 
may assert the privacy and children-in-the-audience rationales as 
justification.‖66  Justice Brennan also criticized Justice Powell for ―rely[ing] 
upon the judgment of the Commission‖ to ―insure that the FCC‘s regulation 
of protected speech does not exceed‖ the boundaries of the facts of the 
case.67 
3. In the Wake of Pacifica, the FCC Followed the Narrow Guidance 
of the Court’s Holding 
In subsequent decisions, the FCC followed the narrow guidance of 
Pacifica and did not find isolated and fleeting expletives to be actionably 
indecent.  For example, in In re Application of WGBH Educational 
Foundation,68 in which petitioners challenged the license renewal of 
WGBH-TV for broadcasting indecent words and images, the FCC denied 
the petitioner‘s request to deny the license renewal, basing its decision on 
the narrow guidance of Pacifica.69  Although the FCC determined that 
WGBH-TV had broadcast indecent programming, the circumstances, 
specifically the lack of respective indecent content and the time of the 
broadcast, were insufficiently similar to the facts of Pacifica to justify 
 
 64. Id. at 760–61. 
 65. Id. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id.  Justice Brennan also added, ―Taken to their logical extreme, these rationales would 
support the cleansing of public radio of any ‗four-letter words‘ whatsoever, regardless of their 
context.‖  Id. at 770–71.  
 67. Id. at 771–72.  Justice Powell expected the Commission ―to proceed cautiously, as it has 
in the past.‖  Id. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Justice 
Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion in which he 
argued that Congress only intended to prohibit obscene speech through Communications Act of 
1934 § 1464.  Id. at 777–80 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
 68. 43 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1436 (1978). 
 69. Id. at 1437.  Petitioner, Morality in Media of Massachusetts, Inc., challenged the license 
renewal based on various incidents of indecency, including a program entitled Rock Follies, 
broadcast at 11:00 p.m. on March 14, 1977, which it described as ―‗vulgar,‘ and as containing 
‗profanity‘ (i.e., ‗The name of God (six times)‘), ‗obscenities‘ such as ‗s[***],‘ ‗bulls[***],‘ etc., 
and action indicating some sexually-oriented content in the program and other programs which 
allegedly contain nudity and/or sexually-oriented material.‖  Id. at 1438 (internal punctuation and 
numbering omitted). 
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denying the license renewal, which would be the equivalent of a sanction 
for indecent broadcasts.70
 
 
The FCC noted that the Court‘s decision in Pacifica ―affords this 
Commission no general prerogative to intervene in any case where words 
similar or identical to those in Pacifica are broadcast . . . .  We intend 
strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica holding.‖71  The FCC 
specifically relied upon its interpretation of Pacifica to refuse sanctions of a 
broadcaster for an isolated expletive.72  The FCC also found compelling 
Justice Powell‘s emphasis on the verbal shock treatment and repetitive 
nature of the Carlin monologue as dispositive in Pacifica, and therefore 
concluded that WGBH-TV‘s indecent programming did not garner the same 
distinction.73
 
Five years after the Pacifica decision, the FCC affirmed its 
commitment to overlooking occasional expletives by denying a challenge 
for a license renewal where the factual circumstances in the case were 
sufficiently similar to Pacifica.  In In re Application of Pacifica 
Foundation,74 petitioners challenged the license renewal of the Pacifica 
Foundation on the grounds that several early morning broadcasts involved 
the use of indecent language including ―motherf[*****],‖ ―s[***],‖ and 
―a[**]holes.‖75  The FCC, however, declined the petitioner‘s challenge 
since it was ―clear that the petitioner ha[d] failed to make a prima facie case 
that [Pacifica Foundation] ha[d] violated 18 U.S.C. 1464‖ because the 
language ―d[id] not amount to . . . repetitious ‗verbal shock treatment‘‖ and 
the petitioner had not shown that such use was more than ―‗isolated use in 
the course of‘ a three year license term.‖76  The FCC‘s insistence on not 
holding isolated and fleeting expletives to be actionably indecent 
demonstrates the agency‘s dedication to narrowly following the Pacifica 
case‘s guidance.77 
4. Even as the FCC Expanded Its Enforcement Powers, It Did Not 
Question the Safe Harbor for Isolated and Fleeting Expletives 
Although it maintained its policy for several years that fleeting 
expletives were not actionable, the FCC began in 1987 to slowly expand its 
 
 70. Id. at 1441 n.6. 
 71. Id. at 1441 (italics added).  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. 95 F.C.C.2d 750 (1983). 
 75. Id. at 759–60.  The petitioner, American Legal Foundation, sought to prevent the license 
renewal of Pacifica for Station WPFW(FM).  Id. at 759.  
 76. Id. at 760–61. 
 77. See id.  
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authority over indecent language.  In In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of 
Pennsylvania (Infinity Order),78 the FCC affirmed three earlier FCC 
decisions that found certain broadcasts to be indecent.79  In doing so, the 
FCC explained that it would no longer take the narrow view that only use of 
the seven words found in Carlin‘s monologue were actionable.80  Instead, 
the FCC pledged to ―use the generic definition of indecency articulated by 
the Commission in 1975 and approved by the Supreme Court in 1978 as 
applied to the Carlin monologue.‖81  Although this clarification of its 
definition of indecency had the effect of expanding its power, the FCC 
maintained its practice, pursuant to Pacifica, of not sanctioning fleeting 
expletives.82 
Broadcasters challenged the FCC‘s attempt to expand its power.83  The 
D.C. Circuit, however, rejected the challenge to the Infinity Order, noting 
that the FCC‘s definition of indecency was ―virtually the same definition 
the Commission articulated in the order reviewed by the Supreme Court in 
the Pacifica case.‖84  In making this decision, the circuit court relied on the 
FCC‘s assurances that it would maintain a restrained enforcement policy.85   
The FCC continued to clarify and expand its enforcement regime 
while providing a safe harbor for isolated and fleeting expletives through its 
 
 78. 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987).  The FCC, in the Infinity Order, affirmed three earlier FCC 
decisions: In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987), In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987), and In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987).  Infinity 
Order, 3 F.C.C.R. at 934. 
 79. Infinity Order, 3 F.C.C.R. at 934 (―The Commission, therefore, reaffirms each of the 
above-captioned rulings.‖). 
 80. Id. at 930 (concluding that the former standard could lead to unjustifiable, anomalous 
results because it ignored an entire category of speech by focusing exclusively on specific words 
rather than the generic definition of indecency). 
 81. Id.; see In re Citizen‘s Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 32 
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1331, 1336 (1975) (describing indecent speech as speech that is offensive to 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium or references sexual or excretory 
activities and organs and is broadcast at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that 
children may be in the audience). 
 82. See In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. at 2703 (―Speech that is indecent must 
involve more than an isolated use of an offensive word.‖); see also In re Pacifica Found., 2 
F.C.C.R. at 2699 (―If a complaint focuses solely on the use of expletives, we believe that under 
the legal standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive 
manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.‖ (emphasis added)).  
 83. See Action for Children‘s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(―Petitioners maintain that the FCC‘s broadened indecency enforcement standard is facially 
invalid because [it is] unconstitutionally vague.‖). 
 84. Id. at 1338. 
 85. Id. at 1340 n.14 (―[T]he FCC has assured this court, at oral argument, that it will continue 
to give weight to reasonable licensee judgments when deciding whether to impose sanctions in a 
particular case.  Thus, the potential chilling effect of the FCC‘s generic definition of indecency 
will be tempered by the Commission‘s restrained enforcement policy.‖ (citation omitted)). 
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Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency.86  Its 
goal was to ―provide guidance to the broadcast industry regarding [the 
FCC‘s] case law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and [the FCC‘s] 
enforcement policies with respect to broadcast indecency.‖87  An indecency 
finding, according to the FCC, is based on two determinations: (1) whether 
the material ―describe[s] or depict[s] sexual or excretory organs or 
activities‖;88 and (2) whether the broadcast is ―patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast 
medium.‖89  The FCC claimed to consider three factors in determining 
whether material is patently offensive:  
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or 
depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether 
the material dwells on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual 
or excretory organs or activities; (3) whether the material appears 
to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material appears to 
have been presented for its shock value.90   
Regarding the second factor in that analysis, the FCC noted that isolated 
and fleeting expletives were characteristics that tended to weigh against a 
finding of indecency.91 
B. The Supreme Court Has Justified Stronger Restrictions on 
Broadcast Communications Than on Other Mediums Because of 
Spectrum Scarcity and the Unique Pervasiveness of the Broadcast 
Media 
The FCC‘s authority to regulate broadcast media resulted from the 
chaos and spectrum scarcity that hallmarked the beginning of broadcast 
media.92  In the Pacifica decision, the Supreme Court articulated two 
additional justifications for the restrictions to the First Amendment 
protections on broadcast media—unique pervasiveness and unique 
accessibility by children.93  These arguments, however, have failed to 
 
 86. 16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001) [hereinafter Industry Guidance]. 
 87. Id. at 7999. 
 88. Id. at 8002. 
 89. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 90. Id. at 8003 (emphasis omitted). 
 91. Id. at 8008. 
 92. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 93. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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justify restricted First Amendment protections for other forms of media 
such as cable television and the Internet.94 
1. The FCC’s Authority to Issue Broadcast Licenses and Regulate 
Airwaves Was Historically Based on the Limited Nature of the 
Broadcast Spectrum  
The chaos caused by broadcast spectrum scarcity was the original 
justification for the FCC‘s regulatory regime on broadcast media.95  The 
Radio Communications Act of 191296 conferred upon the Secretary of 
Commerce the power to regulate frequencies and hours of operation, but not 
the power to enforce those regulations.97  Concluding that broadcast 
frequencies were a ―scare resource‖ that would require control and 
regulation to prevent a ―cacophony of competing voices,‖98 the government 
established
 
 the Federal Radio Commission in 1927 to allocate frequencies 
among competing applications in a manner responsive to the public 
interest.99 
Not long after, the Radio Commission used spectrum scarcity to justify 
the ―Fairness Doctrine,‖ which required radio stations to provide an 
opportunity for opposing views on issues of importance to the public.100  In 
1969, Red Lion Broadcasting Company challenged the Fairness Doctrine 
after the FCC declared that Red Lion had failed to meet its obligation to 
supply time for a rebuttal to a personal attack.101  The D.C. Circuit upheld 
 
 94. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 95. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).  Spectrum scarcity refers to the 
problem of having more people wishing to broadcast than there are available frequencies.  Id. at 
388–89.    
 96. Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 
§ 39, 37 Stat. 1162, 1174. 
 97. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375 n.4 (citing generally United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (ruling that statutory language regarding radio station regulation 
controlled when in conflict with specific license regulations imposed by the Secretary of 
Commerce)); cf. 35 Op. Att‘y Gen. 126, 126–32 (1926) (discussing the Secretary of Commerce‘s 
lack of power to cover broadcasting issues developing after passage of the Radio Communications 
Act of 1912).  See Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part I: Why Can’t Cable Be 
More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 216–17 (1987), for a more detailed discussion on 
the government‘s impotence in regulating broadcast during this time period. 
 98. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376.  
 99. Id. at 376–77.  Eventually, the powers of the Federal Radio Commission would be 
absorbed by the FCC.  See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).  
 100. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377.  
 101. Id. at 371–73.  Fred J. Cook requested time on Radio Station WGCB to respond to a 
personal attack made by the Reverend Billy James Hargis as part of a program series entitled The 
Christian Crusade.  Id. at 371–72.  ―[T]he FCC declared that the Hargis broadcast constituted a 
personal attack on Cook; [and] that Red Lion had failed to meet its obligation under the fairness 
doctrine.‖  Id. at 372. 
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the FCC‘s position as constitutional.102  The Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision and the importance of the Fairness Doctrine.103 
To uphold the Fairness Doctrine and the doctrine‘s inherent limitation 
on free speech, the Supreme Court relied on the premise that the unique 
circumstances of broadcast media called for special restrictions.104  The 
Court reasoned that broadcast‘s potential for chaos meant that the spectrum 
must be regulated and licensed to select individuals ―[i]f intelligible 
communications is to be had, even if the entire radio spectrum is utilized in 
the present state of commercially acceptable technology.‖105  The broadcast 
spectrum‘s scarcity demanded that the government reserve some of the 
spectrum for public functions—aircraft, police, defense, navigation, and so 
on—and refuse to permit others the chance to broadcast.106  
According to the Court, in certain circumstances, spectrum scarcity 
justified requiring licensees to broadcast the views of those without 
licenses.107
 
 Without the Fairness Doctrine, broadcast station owners could 
choose to broadcast a message or opinion and an opposing party would 
have no opportunity for rebuttal.108
  Therefore, the Court ruled that ―[i]t 
does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege 
of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, 
obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great public 
concern.‖109 
The Red Lion Broadcasting Company challenged the notion that 
spectrum scarcity still existed, but the Court saw circumstances that 
suggested otherwise.110
 
 The Court pointed to evidence that showed that 
 
 102. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aff’d, 395 U.S. 367 
(1969). 
 103. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375 (―Believing that the specific application of the fairness doctrine 
in Red Lion . . . [is] authorized by Congress and enhance[s] rather than abridge[s] the freedoms of 
speech and press . . . we hold [it] valid and constitutional . . . .‖). 
 104. Id. at 389 (―It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and 
furthering communications, prevented the Government from making radio communication 
possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to 
overcrowd the spectrum.‖).  The Court cited the example of new technologies that ―produce 
sounds more raucous than those of the human voice‖ and argued that they ―justif[y] restrictions on 
the sound level, and on the hours and places of use . . . so long as the restrictions are reasonable 
and applied without discrimination.‖  Id. at 387 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).  
 105. Id. at 388. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 390. 
 108. Id. at 392 (―[S]tation owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make 
time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues, 
people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed.‖).  
 109. Id. at 394. 
 110. Id. at 396–97.  The Court observed, ―Portions of the spectrum must be reserved for vital 
uses . . . such as radio-navigational aids used by aircraft and vessels‖ as well as police, 
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despite technological advances that have led to a more efficient utilization 
of the frequency spectrum, the demand for such space had also grown, 
leading to conflicts and spectrum congestion.111  The Court was content to 
rely on this evidence, but suggested, based on legislative history, that if the 
number of radio and television stations were not limited by available 
frequencies, the Court would consider removing the restrictions requiring 
equal time.112 
2. Through Pacifica, the Supreme Court Used Broadcast Media’s 
Unique Pervasiveness and Access to Children to Justify the 
FCC’s Authority to Regulate Broadcast Media  
Through the 1960s and 1970s, restrictions on broadcast were based 
primarily on the factual circumstances of broadcast media rather than on 
timeless, articulable principles.  In Pacifica, the Supreme Court articulated 
two factual circumstances that justified unique restrictions on broadcast 
media: (1) broadcast media‘s ―uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of 
all Americans,‖ and (2) its ―unique[] accessib[ility] to children, even those 
too young to read.‖113   
The Pacifica Court argued that broadcast media was ―uniquely 
pervasive‖ because indecent material presented over the airwaves could 
invade the privacy of the individual in his home.114  The Court believed that 
an individual‘s right to privacy outweighed the broadcaster‘s right to 
indecent speech.115 The Court also articulated its ―First Blow‖ theory, 
arguing that because a broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, a 
prior warning cannot completely protect a listener from the ―first blow‖ of 
unexpected program content.116  
The Court also argued that broadcast media was uniquely accessible 
and therefore potentially harmful to children because an indecent broadcast 
 
ambulances, fire departments, and public utilities.  Id. at 397.  The Court also noted spectrum 
congestion caused by ―licensed amateur radio operators‘ equipment‖ and ―5,000,000 transmitters 
operated on the ‗citizens‘ band.‘‖  Id.  
 111. Id. at 396–97.  
 112. Id. at 399 n.26 (citing S. REP. NO. 562, at 8–9 (1959) (reiterating the justification for the 
fairness doctrine)). 
 113. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) (plurality).  
 114. Id. at 748. 
 115. Id. (deciding that ―the individual‘s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder‖ in the privacy of the home). 
 116. Id. at 748–49 (―To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when 
he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the 
first blow.‖). 
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―could have enlarged a child‘s vocabulary in an instant.‖117  The Court 
likened a restriction on broadcast to restrictions on other offensive 
expressions, such as regulations of bookstores and movie theaters, to 
protect children from indecent material.118  The Court argued that the 
government‘s interest in the well-being of youth and a parent‘s right to 
ensure that well-being, through restricted access to broadcast media 
justified regulation of broadcast media.119 
3.  Justifications for Limiting First Amendment Protections for 
Broadcast Media Do Not Apply to Similar Regulations on 
Internet and Cable Speech  
Although the factual circumstances of broadcast media in Red Lion 
and Pacifica justified specific regulations, the absence of similar 
circumstances doomed similar regulations of Internet and cable media.  In 
Reno v. ACLU,120 the Supreme Court held that the justifications for limiting 
First Amendment rights in the broadcast media context are based on 
circumstances that do not apply to the Internet, and therefore broadcast 
media regulations limiting First Amendment rights may not apply to the 
Internet.121  Reno involved the 1996 Communications Decency Act, which 
sought to prohibit the ―knowing transmission of obscene or indecent 
messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.‖122  After President 
Clinton signed the legislation, multiple plaintiffs, including the ACLU, filed 
suit against the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, 
challenging the constitutionality of the Act.123   
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania enjoined the Attorney General from enforcing the 
prohibitions in the Act in so far as the Act related to indecent 
communications.124  The Government argued that prior decisions such as 
Pacifica demonstrated the constitutionality of the Act.125  The Supreme 
 
 117. Id. at 749; see also id. at 750 (noting the ease with which children may access broadcast 
material). 
 118. Id. at 749.  
 119. Id. at 758 (―[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents‘ 
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the 
structure of our society.‖ (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968))). 
 120. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 121. Id. at 870 (―[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment 
scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.‖). 
 122. Id. at 859 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2006)). 
 123. E.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
 124. Id. at 883–84.  
 125. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864. 
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Court, however, affirmed the district court‘s decision and distinguished 
Pacifica from the instant case.126  The Court argued that cyberspace did not 
present the same issues of scarcity and invasiveness that justified the 
uniquely stringent regulations of broadcast media.127  The Court reasoned 
that the Internet‘s sheer size in terms of users and the variety of 
communication categories allow ―any person with a phone line [to] become 
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox.‖128  The Court further determined that the ―Internet is not as 
‗invasive‘ as radio or television‖ because, as the district court stated, 
―‗communications over the Internet do not ―invade‖ an individual‘s home 
or appear on one‘s computer screen unbidden.‘‖129  As a result, the Court 
agreed with the district court‘s assessment of the Internet and found that 
prior cases failed to justify increased restrictions on Internet speech 
protected by the First Amendment.130 
In a similar case regarding cable television, Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC,131 the Supreme Court ruled that First Amendment 
restrictions on broadcast media did not apply to cable television because 
cable did not have the same technological limitations that justified the 
broadcast regulations.132  In Turner, the FCC attempted to justify the 
―must-carry‖133 provisions in the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Competition Act of 1992134 by arguing that the regulation of cable 
television should be analyzed ―under the same First Amendment standard 
that applies to regulation of broadcast television.‖135  The Court found, 
however, that the technological advances of cable ensured no spectrum 
scarcity issues as well as no danger of physical interference between 
 
 126. Id. at 868 (―These precedents, then, surely do not require us to uphold the CDA.‖).  
 127. Id. at 868–69.   
 128. Id. at 868–70 (―The Government estimates that as many as 40 million people use the 
Internet today, and that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999.‖ (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 129. Id. at 868–69 (quoting Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844).  
 130. Id. at 870 (citing Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842).  
 131. 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 132. Id. at 639 (―In light of these fundamental technological differences between broadcast and 
cable transmission, application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion and 
the other broadcast cases is inapt when determining the First Amendment validity of cable 
regulation.‖).  
 133. The ―must-carry‖ provisions ―require[d] cable television systems to devote a portion of 
their channels to the transmission of local broadcast television stations.‖  Id. at 626. 
 134. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, superseded by Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 135. Turner, 512 U.S. at 637. 
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broadcasters.136
 
 As a result of the technological differences among cable 
and broadcast, the Court found that cable could not receive the same limited 
First Amendment protection as broadcast.137 
C. Courts Can Set Aside Agency Decisions Deemed to Be Arbitrary 
and Capricious 
The APA,138 which establishes the mechanism for judicial review of 
agency decisions, empowers courts to set aside agency decisions found to 
be ―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.‖139  The ―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard calls for 
a ―narrow‖ review in which ―a court is not to substitute its judgment for that 
of the agency.‖140  Agencies are required to review relevant information 
and articulate an adequate explanation for their action.141  The agency must 
―examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 
action including a ‗rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.‘‖142  
The Court has discussed several agency actions that would qualify as 
arbitrary and capricious: Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency relied on factors that Congress did not intend it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, 
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.143  When an agency 
rescinds a rule, it is obligated to provide an explanation for the change 
―beyond that which may be required‖ for an agency act in the first 
instance.144  When an agency makes a ―[s]udden and unexplained change‖ 
or ―does not take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation,‖ the 
policy change may be arbitrary and capricious.145 
 
 136. Id. at 638–39 (rejecting the relaxed standard of scrutiny that had been applied in Red Lion 
for these reasons).  
 137. Id. at 639. 
 138. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 139. Id. § 706(2)(A).  
 140. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
 141. Id. at 43 (―In reviewing that explanation, we must ‗consider whether the decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment.‘‖ (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 
(1974))). 
 142. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 42. 
 145. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996). 
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D.  Although the Supreme Court Traditionally Will Avoid Addressing a 
Constitutional Question When Possible, the Court Has Recently 
Illustrated the Flexibility of This Practice  
Traditionally, the Supreme Court limits its review of final decisions to 
issues on which a lower court has already passed judgment.146  In January 
2010, however, the Court made a rare exception to this practice and ruled 
on constitutional grounds not decided upon by the lower court while 
another non-constitutional ground existed to resolve the issue.  In Citizens 
United v. FEC,147 the Court overruled, on constitutional grounds, Section 
203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002‘s (―BCRA‖)148 
prohibition on corporations‘ and unions‘ ability to use general treasury 
funds to make expenditures to advocate the election or defeat of a 
candidate.149  In reaching this ruling, the Court made the unusual decision 
to reach a decision on constitutional grounds in spite of the non-
constitutional ruling of the lower court.150  Although advocates of judicial 
restraint would insist on avoiding such constitutional issues, the Court 
determined that it would be failing in its responsibilities if it were to adopt 
an unsound statutory argument to avoid the constitutional question.151   
To justify this unusual decision, the Court relied on three primary 
arguments: (1) the Supreme Court may address issues that were ―passed 
upon‖ by the lower court even if not specifically ruled upon,152 (2) Citizens 
United raised the claim that the FEC violated its First Amendment right to 
free speech, and therefore, ruling on the constitutional issue would not 
 
 146. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005) (―Because these defensive 
pleas were not addressed by the Court of Appeals, and mindful that we are a court of review, not 
of first view, we do not consider them here.‖); Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 
157, 168–69 (2004) (―We ordinarily do not decide in the first instance issues not decided below.‖ 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rescue Army v. Mun. Ct. of City of L.A., 331 
U.S. 549, 570 n.34 (1947) (―It has long been the Court‘s ‗considered practice not to decide 
abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions . . . or to decide any constitutional question in 
advance of the necessity for its decision.‖ (citation omitted)).  
 147. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 148. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 441b 
(2006)), invalidated by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
 149. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.   
 150. Id. at 891–92 (declining to rule on the statutory issue because the majority was convinced 
that a corporation has a constitutional right to political speech).   
 151. Id. at 892.  
 152. Id. at 892–93 (―Our practice ‗permit[s] review of an issue not pressed [below] so long as 
it has been passed upon . . . .‘‖ (quoting Lebron v. Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 
(1995))).  The Court, however, determined that the district court ―passed upon‖ the issue in a 
manner that satisfied Lebron.  Id.  
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require a new claim,153 and (3) the distinctions between facial and as-
applied are insufficiently defined to control related constitutional 
challenges.154  The Court buttressed these justifications to reach the 
constitutional issue with three considerations regarding its judicial 
responsibilities: (1) not reaching the constitutional issue would lead to 
substantial uncertainty in the law for future litigation,155 (2) the 
considerable time necessary to clarify the meaning of the statutory 
provisions,156 and (3) the importance of free speech for the election 
process.157  The Court determined that the limited treatment of the 
constitutional issues by the lower court, combined with the equitable 
interests in free political speech, demanded that the Court reconsider the 
constitutional precedents of the BCRA.158  
III.  THE COURT‘S REASONING 
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,159 the Supreme Court of the 
United States, by a 5-4 margin, held that the FCC‘s change in policy—
making isolated utterances of indecent language actionable—was not an 
arbitrary or capricious decision within the meaning of the APA.160
 
 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Scalia first addressed the legal standard of 
 
 153. Id. at 893 (―Once a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in 
support of that claim.‖ (quoting Lebron, 513 U.S. at 379)).  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
because Citizens United raised the First Amendment issue below, it was not a new claim and 
therefore it could be examined by the Court.  Id.  
 154. Id.  The Court determined that parties‘ conduct could not preclude the Court from 
exploring certain remedies or broader issues.  See id. (―‗[O]nce a case is brought, no general 
categorical line bars a court from making broader pronouncements of invalidity in properly as-
applied cases.‘‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied 
and Facial Challenges and Third Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2000))).  
 155.  Id. at 894–95.  The Government suggested an alternative ground on which the case could 
be resolved without reaching the constitutional issue, but the Court failed to adopt this view.  Id. 
(―When the Government holds out the possibility of ruling for Citizens United on a narrow ground 
yet refrains from adopting that position, the added uncertainty demonstrates the necessity to 
address the [constitutional question].‖).   
 156. Id. at 895.  The Court feared that litigation stemming from the BCRA would be 
troublesome because it would likely impact a speaker‘s political speech and because once the 
litigation extended past the election date (which would be likely), neither party would have an 
incentive to resolve the claims.  Id.  
 157. Id.  The Court believed that without addressing the constitutional issues, the current law 
would serve as the functional equivalent of a prior restraint.  Id. (―[A] speaker who wants to avoid 
threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against FEC enforcement must ask a 
governmental agency for prior permission to speak.‖).  The Court determined that this 
―unprecedented governmental intervention‖ justified reviewing the constitutional precedents that 
supported the statute in question.  Id. at 896.  
 158. Id.   
 159. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
 160. Id. at 1812. 
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―arbitrary and capricious‖ for reviewing the case.161  Specifically, Justice 
Scalia argued that the APA does not call for a more searching review or a 
heightened standard of review beyond requiring that the agency show that 
there were good reasons for the policy change and that the agency believed 
these changes improved upon the previous policy.162  Justice Scalia 
declined to address the constitutional issue altogether because the Second 
Circuit had ruled solely on the APA issue.163 
Justice Scalia, disagreeing with the Second Circuit, argued that the 
FCC acknowledged that its recent policy represented a break with old laws 
and explicitly disavowed them as good law.164  Justice Scalia further argued 
that the FCC‘s decision fit within the context-based approach of 
Pacifica.165  Justice Scalia found that advances in technology that allow 
broadcasters to ―bleep out‖ easily offending words support the 
Commission‘s broader enforcement policy.166  He also found that the 
agency‘s decision not to impose any sanctions illustrated that the FCC did 
not act arbitrarily.167  Justice Scalia also argued that the FCC‘s decision not 
to sanction isolated and fleeting expletives did not preclude it from doing so 
in the future.168
  
Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued that the Second Circuit 
failed to appreciate the logic inherent in the agency‘s argument that a per se 
exemption for fleeting expletives would lead to increased use of 
expletives.169 
Justice Scalia also dismissed the respondents‘ argument that the FCC 
did not acknowledge that its action represented a change in policy because 
he believed the FCC explicitly had done so.170  He further argued that, 
contrary to the respondents‘ position, this policy fit within the guidance of 
 
 161. Id. at 1810–11.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 1819 (―The Second Circuit did not definitely rule on the constitutionality of the 
Commission‘s orders, but respondents nonetheless ask us to decide their validity under the First 
Amendment.  This Court, however, is one of final review, ‗not of first view.‘‖ (quoting Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 554 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005))).  Justice Scalia criticized the dissent‘s decision to 
punish the agency for not discussing the constitutional implications of the policy change and 
argued that such explanation had not been traditionally required for agency policy changes.  Id. at 
1817–18. 
 164. Id. at 1812. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1813. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.  In addition, Justice Scalia argued that the Second Circuit‘s finding of the policy as too 
extreme failed to appreciate the role context would play in the FCC‘s policy determination.  Id. at 
1814. 
 169. Id. at 1812–13. 
 170. Id. at 1814–15. 
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Pacifica because that decision did not explicitly act as a bright-line rule 
against broader findings of indecency.171 
Justice Scalia also responded to the arguments raised by the dissenting 
Justices,172 but these arguments were joined only by Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito.173  
Justice Thomas, concurring, wrote separately to address the 
constitutional issues outside the scope of the APA analysis.174
 
 Justice 
Thomas questioned the viability of Court precedents such as Pacifica and 
Red Lion.175  He argued that these precedents, which are partially based on 
the nature of the medium, seem less persuasive in light of technological 
advances.176
 
 Justice Thomas suggested that ―dramatic changes in factual 
circumstances‖ surrounding these mediums support a departure from these 
precedents and their justifications for the FCC‘s enforcement regime, but he 
believed that a review of the constitutional validity of Pacifica and Red 
Lion ought to be made at a different time.177
  
Justice Kennedy, concurring, wrote separately to address the need for 
an agency to explain a change in policy and why it has chosen to reject 
considerations that prompted it to adopt the initial policy.178
 
 Justice 
Kennedy argued that an agency‘s decision to change course may be 
 
 171. Id. at 1815. 
 172. Id. at 1815–19 (plurality opinion).  Justice Scalia, in response to Justice Breyer‘s claim 
that the independent nature of agencies required the judiciary to be more vigilant of their 
activities, argued that oversight of the FCC had shifted from the President to Congress, which put 
pressure on the FCC to expand its enforcement.  Id.  Justice Scalia also reasoned that if Congress 
controls the FCC, as Justice Stevens posited in his dissent, Congress‘s desire for stronger 
enforcement supports a finding that the new policy is not arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 1816.  
Justice Scalia also argued that Justice Breyer failed to acknowledge the role that context would 
play in alleviating concerns that a stronger enforcement regime would hurt smaller local 
broadcasters lacking the technology to prevent isolated expletives and would lead to a chill on live 
broadcasts.  Id. at 1818–19. 
 173. Id. at 1805.   
 174. Id. at 1819–20 (Thomas, J., concurring) (―I write separately, however, to note the 
questionable viability of the two precedents that support the FCC‘s assertion of constitutional 
authority to regulate the programming at issue in this case.‖ (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 
U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969))).  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1820–22. 
 177. Id. at 1822 (―These dramatic changes in factual circumstances might well support a 
departure from precedent under the prevailing approach to stare decisis. . . .  I am open to 
reconsideration of Red Lion and Pacifica in the proper case.‖). 
 178. Id. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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arbitrary and capricious if the agency ignores earlier factual findings 
without a reasoned explanation.179   
Justice Stevens dissented, based on two perceived flaws in the Court‘s 
reasoning.  First, Justice Stevens argued that because the FCC‘s initial 
policy was developed with expert and congressional input, its new policy 
should reflect Congress‘s wishes and the agency must show why the prior 
policy is no longer sound.180  Second, he asserted that the Court improperly 
assumed that Pacifica endorsed a construction of ―indecent‖ that would 
include any expletive with sexual or excretory origin.181  Justice Stevens 
argued that the Pacifica decision was narrow, finding that a twelve-minute, 
expletive-filled monologue was indecent.182
 
 The FCC‘s new policy, he 
reasoned, expands this scope beyond repetitive expletives without adequate 
justification, and therefore is arbitrary and capricious.183 
Justice Ginsburg dissented and wrote separately to emphasize that the 
FCC‘s new policy raised many of the concerns first voiced in Pacifica and 
that if the constitutional issue were revisited, the Court ―should be mindful 
that words unpalatable to some may be ‗commonplace‘ for others, ‗the stuff 
of everyday conversations.‘‖184 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, 
dissented because the FCC‘s change in policy was based on factors that 
were preexisting when the prior policy was formed, and the FCC failed to 
explain why the agency decided to reevaluate those factors.185  Because an 
agency must act consistently, Justice Breyer argued, any agency must 
justify a policy change when its original policy was based on logic, reason, 
and factual circumstances.186  
Justice Breyer found the FCC‘s lack of explanation of First 
Amendment concerns to be dispositive, not because the agency is obligated 
to discuss the Constitution, but rather because the First Amendment‘s 
boundaries had played such a prominent role in the formation of the 
 
 179. Id. at 1824.  Justice Kennedy also determined, however, that the FCC based its policy on 
the Pacifica decision rather than on factual findings and that its reasons for the change are the sort 
of reasons an agency may consider and act upon.  Id. 
 180. Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 1827. 
 183. Id. at 1828. 
 184. Id. at 1829 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776 
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).  
 185. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer noted that the FCC had previously followed 
Pacifica in a narrow manner and therefore did not adequately justify, on constitutional grounds, its 
expanded scope.  Id. at 1833–34. 
 186. Id. at 1830.   
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original policy.187  According to Justice Breyer, the FCC failed to rely on 
empirical evidence for several of its justifications and failed to explain why 
many of its concerns regarding increasing rates of isolated utterances had 
yet to materialize under the former policy.188   
Finally, Justice Breyer argued that a remand would give the FCC an 
opportunity to review its policy in light of the constitutional concerns raised 
through the prior proceedings, whereas the Court would prefer to foreclose 
such a discussion.189 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that the FCC provided a reasoned basis and explanation 
for its new policy, and therefore, ruled that the change in policy was not 
arbitrary and capricious.190  In so holding, the Court failed to require the 
FCC to provide an adequate justification for its new policy that would 
satisfy the arbitrary and capricious standard.191
 
 In addition, the Court 
should have found the agency‘s policy to be arbitrary and capricious 
because it improperly relies upon cases whose factual underpinnings no 
longer justify limited First Amendment protection on broadcast media.192  
The Court also should have taken this opportunity to address the glaring 
weaknesses in the FCC‘s constitutional authority to limit First Amendment 
rights of broadcast media because that authority is based on historical 
circumstances of broadcast media that no longer exist and therefore cannot 
provide a constitutional basis for limiting First Amendment rights of 
broadcast media.193 
 
 187. Id. at 1832–33.  Because the FCC ―works in the shadow of the First Amendment,‖ Justice 
Breyer reasoned, the FCC therefore must adequately explain its change in policy in constitutional 
terms as well.  Id. at 1835. 
 188. Id. at 1839.  Justice Breyer also criticized the FCC for failing to consider the policy‘s 
potential impact on smaller broadcasters as well as a potential chill in coverage that might result.  
Id. at 1835. 
 189. Id. at 1840 (―And a remand here would do no more than ask the agency to reconsider its 
policy decision in light of concerns raised in a judicial opinion.‖). 
 190. Id. at 1812 (majority opinion). 
 191. See infra Part IV.A. 
 192. See infra Part IV.B. 
 193. See infra Part IV.C. 
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A. The Court Should Have Found the FCC’s New Policy to Be 
Arbitrary and Capricious Because the Agency Failed to Provide an 
Adequate Explanation for the Change 
The Court failed to require the FCC to provide an adequate 
explanation for its change in policy, which now allows the FCC to find 
isolated and fleeting expletives actionable.  Although the FCC has argued 
that the new policy is not a change in policy, precedent demonstrates that 
the agency has never before sanctioned isolated and fleeting expletives.194  
The FCC‘s primary reason for the new policy, specifically the 
consequences of the ―First Blow‖ theory, fails adequately to justify the new 
policy because the FCC neglected to explain why this theory, thirty years 
after its first articulation, has suddenly become so compelling as to require a 
significantly different policy.195 
1. Regardless of the FCC’s Characterization of the Golden Globes 
Order, Its Action Announced a New Policy that Requires a 
Proper Explanation 
The FCC‘s decision to find fleeting expletives actionable represents a 
significant change in policy that must be properly explained.196  The agency 
itself acknowledged this change when it issued the Golden Globes 
Order.197
 
 The agency also acknowledged the change in policy in both its 
Omnibus Order and its brief to the Court of Appeals.198  The Remand 
 
 194. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 195. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 196. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 2007) (―[T]he FCC 
has failed to articulate a reasoned basis for this change in policy.‖), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009); 
see also In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 (1987) (―If a complaint focuses solely 
on the use of expletives, we believe that under the legal standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate 
and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.‖); In re 
Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 43 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1436, 1441 & n.6 (1978) 
(distinguishing between the ―‗verbal shock treatment‘‖ of the George Carlin monologue and ―‗the 
isolated use of a potentially offensive word‘‖ and finding that the single use of an expletive in a 
program ―should not call for us to act under the holding of Pacifica‖ (quoting FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757, 760–61 (1978))); Industry Guidance, supra note 86, at 8008–09 
(distinguishing between material that is repeated or dwelled on and material that is ―‗fleeting and 
isolated‘‖ (quoting Letter to L.M. Commc‘ns of S.C., Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. 1595, 1595 (1992))); Letter 
to L.M. Commc‘ns of S.C., Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. at 1595 (finding that the single utterance of an 
expletive is not indecent because it was a ―fleeting and isolated utterance which, within the 
context of live and spontaneous programming, does not warrant a Commission sanction‖). 
 197. See Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4980 (2004) (―We now depart from this 
portion of the Commission‘s 1987 Pacifica decision . . . and any similar cases holding that 
isolated or fleeting use of the ‗F-Word‘ or a variant thereof in situations such as this is not 
indecent . . . .‖).  
 198. See Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2692 (2006) (―[W]e recognize that our precedent 
at the time of the broadcast indicated that the Commission would not take enforcement action 
against isolated use of expletives.‖); see also Respondent‘s Brief at 33, Fox, 489 F.3d 444 (06-
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Order, however, seems to backtrack on this admission and instead suggests 
that the agency has not previously ruled on the issue of isolated 
expletives.199   
The FCC‘s description of its previous lack of sanctions on isolated 
expletives fails to acknowledge how significantly the narrow holding in 
Pacifica impacted and shaped the FCC‘s ―restrained enforcement policy‖ of 
the past.200  The Remand Order fails to fully discuss the agency‘s shift from 
the narrow Pacifica holding.201  Furthermore, the FCC suggested its new 
policy cannot conflict with Pacifica since Pacifica did not address the 
question of isolated and fleeting expletives.202 This representation of 
Pacifica as leaving open the question of fleeting expletives represents a far 
cry from thirty years of narrow obedience to the case‘s holding.203  More 
importantly, the FCC has taken advantage of the good faith courts have 
placed in the agency.  For instance, Justice Powell‘s concurrence in 
Pacifica relied on the FCC‘s commitment to following the plurality‘s 
holding narrowly, and the court in Action for Children’s Television also 
 
1760-ag), 2006 WL 5486967 (―In the Golden Globe Order, the Commission made clear that it 
was changing course with respect to the treatment of isolated expletives.‖). 
 199. See Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13307 (2006) (―Then, in 2004, the Commission 
itself considered for the first time in an enforcement action whether a single use of an expletive 
could be indecent.  And in evaluating the broadcast of the F-Word during ‗The Golden Globe 
Awards,‘ we overturned the Bureau-level decisions holding that an isolated expletive could not be 
indecent and disavowed our 1987 dicta on which those decisions were based.‖). 
 200. See Action for Children‘s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1340 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(―[T]he FCC has assured this court, at oral argument, that it will continue to give weight to 
reasonable licensee judgments when deciding whether to impose sanctions in a particular case.  
Thus, the potential chilling effect of the FCC‘s generic definition of indecency will be tempered 
by the Commission‘s restrained enforcement policy.‖ (citation omitted)); see also Fox, 489 F.3d at 
450 (describing the FCC‘s enforcement policy as ―restrained‖). 
 201. See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1834 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the FCC‘s order does 
not ―acknowledge that an entirely different understanding of Pacifica underlay the FCC's earlier 
policy; they do not explain why the agency changed its mind about the line that Pacifica draws or 
its policy‘s relation to that line‖). 
 202. See Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13,308–09 (―[I]t is significant that the ‗occasional 
expletive‘ contemplated by the [Pacifica] Court was one that occurred in ‗a two-way radio 
conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher,‘—a conversation not broadcast to a wide 
audience—‗or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy,‘ settings far removed from the broadcast at 
issue here.‖ (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978))); see also Pacifica, 438 
U.S. at 760–61 (―The Commission‘s holding, and certainly the Court‘s holding today, does not 
speak to cases involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word in the course of a radio 
broadcast.‖). 
 203. See In re Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 43 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1436, 1441  
(1978) (noting that the Court‘s decision in Pacifica ―affords this Commission no general 
prerogative to intervene in any case where words similar or identical to those in Pacifica are 
broadcast‖ and stating that ―[w]e intend strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica 
holding.‖ (italics added)); see also supra note 196 (listing instances of narrow obedience to 
Pacifica).  
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relied on the agency‘s commitment to a ―restrained enforcement policy.‖204  
Regardless of how the FCC interprets the policy it announced in the Golden 
Globes Order, either as a new policy or not, the Supreme Court has 
concluded that this new policy demands a sufficient explanation that meets 
the ―arbitrary and capricious‖ test.205 
2.  The ―First Blow‖ Theory Is an Insufficient Explanation for a 
Policy Change Because the Theory Existed at the Time of the 
Original Policy’s Development 
The primary reason206 for new policy posited by the FCC, the ―First 
Blow‖ theory,207 fails to adequately justify the new policy because the FCC 
did not explain why such a theory, which has existed since Pacifica, only 
now justifies a wider enforcement of isolated and fleeting expletives.208  
The FCC justified the change by arguing that ―granting an automatic 
exemption for ‗isolated or fleeting‘ expletives unfairly forces viewers 
(including children) to take ‗the first blow.‘‖209  The ―First Blow‖ theory, 
however, fails to justify the change in policy because the concept of the 
―first blow‖ has existed since Pacifica, but it has never before been used to 
justify a stronger regulatory regime.210  Although the Court suggested that 
 
 204. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC‘s cautious approach to 
enforcement actions); see also Action for Children’s Television, 852 F.2d at 1340 n.14 (―[T]he 
FCC has assured this court, at oral argument, that it will continue to give weight to reasonable 
licensee judgments when deciding whether to impose sanctions in a particular case.  Thus, the 
potential chilling effect of the FCC‘s generic definition of indecency will be tempered by the 
Commission‘s restrained enforcement policy.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 205. See supra text accompanying note 164 (acknowledging that the FCC‘s decision to find 
isolated and fleeting expletives actionable represents a shift in policy). 
 206. Petitioners stated that the two other reasons to justify the change in policy were (1) it 
replaces a purportedly per se rule with a contextual, case-by-case approach to fleeting expletives, 
and (2) it prevents the risk that broadcasters would air isolated expletives more frequently.  Brief 
for the Petitioners at 23–26, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 2308909.  There was, 
however, ―never a per se rule against liability for isolated expletives; the FCC‘s contextual 
approach that followed from Pacifica required that an utterance, whether repeated or not, 
constitute ‗verbal shock treatment.‘‖  Brief of Respondent at 19, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-
582), 2008 WL 3153439; see also supra note 188 and accompanying text (criticizing the FCC for 
failing to produce evidence that the new policy was needed to stop an increase of expletives over 
the airwaves).   
 207. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the ―First Blow‖ theory). 
 208. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 458 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. 
Ct. 1800 (2009) (―[T]he Commission provides no reasonable explanation for why it has changed 
its perception that a fleeting expletive was not a harmful ‗first blow‘ for the nearly thirty years 
between Pacifica and Golden Globes.‖); see also Brief of Respondent at 28, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 
(No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3153439 (same). 
 209. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13309 (2006). 
 210. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC‘s silence on the question 
of why the ―first blow‖ of an isolated expletive is more harmful than it was thirty years ago). 
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the agency ―could rationally decide it needed to step away from its old 
regime where nonrepetitive use of an expletive was per se 
nonactionable,‖211 the FCC is still required to account for its new 
interpretation of the harms presented by the first blow—a requirement that 
was not satisfied in the present case.212  The FCC also failed to explain why 
the original reasons for not finding isolated expletives as actionable based 
on the ―First Blow‖ theory are no longer dispositive.213  The agency‘s mere 
recitation of the ―First Blow‖ theory without any additional information or 
reasoning that would suggest why, after thirty years, this theory now 
warrants an entirely different policy, can only be described as a ―sudden 
and unexplained change,‖ and therefore, is arbitrary and capricious.214   
B. The Court Failed to Acknowledge that the Factual Circumstances 
that Originally Justified Restricting Broadcast Media’s First 
Amendment Rights No Longer Exist, and Therefore the FCC’s 
Policy, Relying on Case Law Based on Those Circumstances, Is 
Arbitrary and Capricious 
In addition to lacking an adequate explanation for its change in policy, 
the FCC‘s new policy is arbitrary and capricious because it ―failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem,‖215 namely that modern 
technology has eroded the circumstantial justifications for the unique First 
Amendment limitations on broadcast media.  First, the factual 
circumstances that prompted the rulings in Red Lion and Pacifica have 
changed and are vestiges of the past, and the logic of such limits on First 
Amendment protection has been entirely rejected with regard to other forms 
of media.216  Second, as the similarities between broadcast media and other 
forms of media grow, the justifications for placing special restrictions on 
broadcast media grow weaker and more illogical.217   
 
 211. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1813. 
 212. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 458 (2d Cir. 2007) (―[T]he 
Commission provides no reasonable explanation for why it has changed its perception that a 
fleeting expletive was not a harmful ‗first blow‘ for the nearly thirty years between Pacifica and 
Golden Globes.‖). 
 213. See supra note 208 and accompanying text; see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 
U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (―Sudden and unexplained change, or change that does not take account of 
legitimate reliance on prior interpretation, may be ‗arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of 
discretion.‘‖ (citations omitted)). 
 214. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 215. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983); see also supra text accompanying note 143 (discussing possible reasons why an agency 
policy may be arbitrary and capricious).  
 216. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 217. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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1. Red Lion and Pacifica Are No Longer Viable Precedents to 
Justify the FCC’s Restrictions on Broadcast Media’s First 
Amendment Rights  
The FCC improperly bases its enforcement regime on decisions, such 
as Red Lion and Pacifica, that no longer justify restrictions on broadcast 
media‘s First Amendment rights.218  Red Lion found that the government 
was justified in regulating broadcast media because ―[w]ithout government 
control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacophony of 
competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably 
heard.‖219  The Court in Pacifica went beyond the argument of spectrum 
scarcity and justified greater regulation based on broadcast media‘s 
―uniquely pervasive presence‖ and its ―unique[] accessib[ility] to 
children.‖220  Thirty years later, however, ―dramatic technological advances 
have eviscerated the factual assumptions underlying those decisions.‖221 
Broadcast spectrum scarcity is no longer the problem it had been in the 
past.222
  
For instance, the number of over-the-air broadcast stations grew 
from 7411 in 1969 to more than 15,000 by the end of 2004.223  Justice 
Thomas, in his concurrence, noted that ―the trend should continue with 
broadcast television‘s imminent switch from analog to digital transmission, 
which will allow the FCC to ‗stack broadcast channels right beside one 
another along the spectrum, and ultimately utilize significantly less than the 
400 MHz of spectrum the analog system absorbs today.‘‖224  These 
advances indicate that modern technology has created spectrum abundance 
where there once was spectrum scarcity—a development that undermines 
the validity of cases such as Red Lion.225   
 
 218. See The Supreme Court 2008 Term—Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 352, 361 (2009) 
(―In light of these factual and legal developments, an FCC revision of its constitutional position 
probably should have counseled relaxation of its enforcement policy, rather than expansion.‖). 
 219. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). 
 220. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) (plurality). 
 221. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1821 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 222. See generally supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the beginnings of broadcast media without 
regulation). 
 223. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1821 (citing Brief of Respondents NBC Universal, Inc., NBC 
Telemundo License Co., CBS Broad, Inc., and ABC, Inc. at 37–38, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-
582), 2008 WL 3153438; see also Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting?: Toward a 
Consistent First Amendment Standard for the Information Age, 15 COMMLAW CONSPETCUS 431, 
438 (2007) (stating that the number of broadcast television stations and radio stations has doubled 
since 1969). 
 224. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1821 (quoting Consumer Elecs. Ass‘n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 294 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003)).  
 225. See supra notes 218, 222 and accompanying text (arguing that factual circumstances have 
eroded the justifications for limiting the First Amendment rights of broadcast media); see also 
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The FCC has acknowledged many of these arguments.  John 
Berresford, a staff attorney in the FCC‘s Media Bureau, concluded that the 
scarcity rationale ―is based on fundamental misunderstandings of physics 
and economics, efficient resource allocation, recent field measurements, 
and technology,‖ and ―is outmoded in today‘s media marketplace.‖226  The 
eroding validity of spectrum scarcity directly weakens the FCC‘s 
justification for its enforcement regime, which has relied on this concept to 
regulate broadcast media.227 
Recent spectrum abundance is coupled with access to cable and 
satellite television, satellite radio, the Internet, and blogs, all of which 
suggest that no one source of information, even broadcast media, is 
dominant or deserving of unique restrictions.228  The dual developments of 
spectrum abundance and the explosion of alternative media forms mean that 
―traditional broadcast television and radio are no longer the ‗uniquely 
pervasive‘ media forms they once were.‖229  When considering the variety 
of sources of information available to the average American, ―[s]carcity is 
the last word that would come to mind in regard to the vast array of 
communications outlets available today.‖230 
Although the FCC presented evidence suggesting that broadcasting 
remains ―‗a principal source of information and entertainment for a great 
part of the Nation‘s population,‘‖231 broadcast media is no longer uniquely 
 
Winer, supra note 97, at 239 (―[T]he scarcity rationale for regulation of broadcasting was flawed 
on factual, legal, and policy grounds as well as in its application.‖). 
 226. John W. Berresford, The Scarcity Rationale for Regulating Traditional Broadcasting: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Passed ii (FCC Media Bureau Staff, Research Paper, 2005), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-257534A1.pdf.  
 227. See supra notes 218, 222 and accompanying text.  
 228. Cf. In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission‘s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,634 (2003) (―In 1979, the vast majority of households had six or 
fewer local television stations to choose from, three of which were typically affiliated with a 
broadcast network.‖).  ―In 2002, for the first time, cable television collectively had more 
primetime viewers on average over the course of the year than broadcast programming (48% share 
for cable programming versus 46% share for broadcast programming).‖  Id. at 13,665.  Today, 
approximately eighty-six percent of U.S. households subscribe to cable or satellite television.  In 
re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 
Programming, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, 2506–07 (2006).  Satellite radio, an industry that did not even 
exist prior to December 2001, boasted around fourteen million subscribers nationwide between the 
two providers, Sirius and XM, by the end of 2006.  Sarah McBride, What a Difference a Year Has 
Made for Once-Highflying Satellite Radio, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at B1.  Roughly three-
quarters of Americans are now online and spend an average of nine hours weekly on the Internet.  
In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. at 13,765.  
 229. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1822.  
 230. Steve Chapman, You Will Watch the Debates on Airwaves, Feds Don’t Know Best, CHI. 
TRIB., Oct. 15, 2000, at C19. 
 231. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13,299, 13,318 (2006) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 190 (1997)).  The Kaiser Family Foundation reports that ―68 percent of 
2010] FCC v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC. 59 
 
pervasive as it was in the time of Red Lion and Pacifica.  Many Americans 
still rely on broadcast televisions and radios, but the ubiquitous presence of 
a host of other forms of information and entertainment means that broadcast 
media no longer has a unique hold on the American eye and ear.232  
Abundance does not necessitate a finding of unique pervasiveness, nor does 
it justify restrictions on First Amendment rights.  A media comparison 
study in 2008 found that just under forty percent of people surveyed used 
broadcast as their ―primary‖ news source.233  This number is substantial, 
but it hardly can be considered so dominant as to require its own form of 
regulation when sixty percent of those surveyed primarily use public 
television, cable, radio, newspapers, and other media as sources of news.  
Technology has rendered broadcast media no longer unique and it has 
subsequently eroded the FCC‘s ability to rely on unique pervasiveness as a 
justification for restrictions on broadcast media‘s First Amendment 
rights.234  As a result, the Court should have found the FCC‘s reliance on 
such anachronistic cases for its new policy as arbitrary and capricious.235 
Furthermore, broadcast media can hardly be understood as uniquely 
accessible to children today because they have comparable access to 
indecent material via broadcast, cable, and the Internet.236  This 
technological development demonstrates that broadcast media is no longer 
―uniquely‖ accessible to children.237  It was not broadcast‘s abundance, but 
 
children aged eight to 18 have a television set in their bedrooms, and nearly half of those sets do 
not have cable or satellite connections.‖  Id. at 13,319 (citing KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
GENERATION M: MEDIA IN THE LIVES OF 8–18 YEAR-OLDS 77 (2005)).  
 232. See supra text accompanying note 230 (discussing how various media forms have grown 
in popularity over the last twenty years). 
 233. Television Bureau of Advertising, Inc., TVB Media Comparisons Study 2008, Adults 
18+, http://www.tvb.org/rcentral/mediatrendstrack/tvbasics/43_PrimaryNewsSource.asp (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2010). 
 234. See supra notes 218, 222 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 226–227. 
 236. Brief of Respondent at 44, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) 
(No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3153439 (―As more and more traditional audio and video content is 
delivered by means of the Internet, broadcasting will become even less unique in its accessibility 
to children.‖).  The National Center for Education Statistics (―NCES‖) estimates that ―about 90 
percent of children and adolescents ages 5–17 (47 million persons) use computers, and about 59 
percent (31 million persons) use the Internet.‖  NAT‘L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, COMPUTER 
AND INTERNET USE BY CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN 2001 iv (2004).  In addition, the NCES 
estimates that ―about three-quarters of 5-year-olds use computers, and over 90 percent of teens 
(ages 13–17) do so.‖  Id.   
 237. See Brief of Respondent at 43–44, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3153439 
(discussing broadcast media‘s decreasingly unique accessibility compared to the Internet and 
cable); see also Jonathan D. Wallace, The Specter of Pervasiveness: Pacifica, New Media, and 
Freedom of Speech 1 (Cato Institute, Briefing Paper No. 35, 1998), available at  
http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-035.pdf (―[T]he logic of pervasiveness could apply to cable 
television, the Internet, and even the print media.  If such logic applies to any medium, it could 
apply to all media.‖). 
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rather its dominance, that originally justified its unique regulation.238  
Without this dominance, the FCC has a more difficult case for justifying 
such unique regulations.239  Furthermore, advances in technology such as 
the V-Chip240 have allowed parents ―to use a standardized rating system to 
pre-set their televisions to block the content of programming and ensure 
that their children are not exposed to potentially offensive language‖ and 
have eliminated the need and justification for government regulation.241  
All of this evidence strongly suggests that in the absence of this dominance, 
such regulations are no longer justified.242 
The FCC‘s authority to limit the First Amendment rights of broadcast 
media derives from precedents such as Red Lion and Pacifica.243
  
Modern 
technology, however, has eroded the validity of these precedents, and 
therefore the Court erred in determining that the FCC‘s new policy finding 
isolated expletives to be actionable was not arbitrary and capricious.244 
2.  As the Similarities Between Broadcast Media and Other Forms 
of Media Grow, the Justifications for Unique Broadcast 
Regulations Become Increasingly Illogical 
The changing circumstances of broadcast media have driven it closer 
in appearance and form to cable television and the Internet, and farther 
away from broadcast media of the 1970s, thereby suggesting that regulating 
broadcast media in a different manner245 no longer makes sense.246  The 
 
 238. See Industry Guidance, supra note 86, at 8020 (―If the rules regulating broadcast content 
were ever a justifiable infringement of speech, it was because of the relative dominance of that 
medium in the communications marketplace of the past.‖). 
 239. See supra note 218 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying note 221. 
 240. The V-Chip enables television programs to be blocked based on their rating.  FCC, V-
Chip: Viewing Television Responsibly, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip (last visited June 27, 2010).    
 241. Brief of Respondent at 45–46, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3153439 
(citing FCC, supra note 240).  But see Sibile Morency, V-Chip for Computers is Proposed, ABC 
NEWS, Apr. 17, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=3488856&page=1 (discussing 
critics‘ beliefs that the V-Chip is a failure). 
 242. See Thierer, supra note 223, at 451 (―In sum, in a world of technological convergence and 
media abundance, everything is pervasive.  Consequently, it is illogical to claim that broadcasting 
holds a unique status among all the competing media outlets and technologies in the 
marketplace.‖). 
 243. See supra Part II.B (explaining the factual circumstances that justified limited First 
Amendment protection for broadcast media in Red Lion and Pacifica). 
 244. See Thierer, supra note 223, at 440 (noting that the technological advances in media have 
rendered regulations outdated and unnecessary, and predicting that the Supreme Court would 
―drive the final stake through the heart of Red Lion and the scarcity rationale‖). 
 245. Although broadcast is regulated more stringently than cable, satellite, and the Internet, 
those other forms of media are not without substantive regulations.  For instance, although the 
FCC only monitors broadcast for indecent material, the agency enforces prohibitions on obscene 
material against cable and satellite services.  FCC Enforcement Bureau, Obscenity, Indecency & 
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growing similarity between broadcast media, which is subject to unique 
restrictions, and cable television247 and the Internet,248 subject to much 
weaker regulations, leaves the Pervasiveness Doctrine249 at a crossroads: Is 
the Doctrine applicable to other mediums or has it become an 
anachronism?250
 
 Court decisions regarding the regulation of other mediums 
consistently reject the applicability of the Pervasiveness Doctrine, 
recognizing that it is a vestige of a period of broadcast long past.251   
The Court‘s reasoning in Reno and Turner distinguishing the Internet 
and cable television from broadcast scarcity in 1978 also applies to the 
distinction between the broadcast media of 1978 and the broadcast media of 
today, demonstrating that unique restrictions on broadcast media lack 
reasoned support.252  The Court ruled that Pacifica could not justify the 
Communications Decency Act because the factual circumstances of the 
Internet are ―unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first 
 
Profanity—Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html (last visited June 
27, 2010).  Congress has enacted several laws intended to combat the spread of objectionable 
material and conduct on the Internet, namely material and conduct related to child pornography 
and sexual predators.  See PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–401, 122 Stat. 
4229 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17601–17631, 2258A–2258E) (requiring the Department of Justice 
to aid law enforcement efforts, including Internet Crimes Against Children task forces, to 
investigate and prosecute child predators); Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-400, 122 Stat. 4224 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16915a–16915b) (requiring 
sexual offenders to register Internet identifiers, such as e-mails); Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-452, 122 Stat. 5025 (requiring the FCC to investigate and report on the 
sufficiency of parental blocking technologies for platforms such as the Internet). 
 246. See Angela J. Campbell, The Legacy of Red Lion, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 788 (2008) (―I 
do not think it makes sense to apply different First Amendment tests to the same program 
depending on whether it comes into a home by broadcast, cable, or Internet.‖); Randolph J. May, 
Charting A New Constitutional Jurisprudence for the Digital Age, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 373, 
376 (2009) (stating that First Amendment jurisprudence should ―accord all the electronic media 
the same high level of free speech protection that the print media has always enjoyed‖); Wallace, 
supra note 237, at 1 (―[T]he logic of pervasiveness could apply to cable television, the Internet, 
and even the print media.‖). 
 247. See supra note 132 and accompany text (concluding that cable television cannot be 
regulated like broadcast media). 
 248. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (concluding that the Internet cannot be 
regulated like broadcast media). 
 249. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing broadcast as ―uniquely pervasive‖). 
 250. See Wallace, supra note 237, at 1 (―[T]he logic of pervasiveness could apply to cable 
television, the Internet, and even the print media.  If such logic applies to any medium, it could 
apply to all media.‖).  
 251. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (disusing case precedent that concluded that 
cable television cannot be regulated like broadcast media); see also supra note 121 and 
accompanying text (discussing case precedent that concluded that that the Internet cannot be 
regulated like broadcast media). 
 252. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of logic behind regulating 
broadcast more stringently than other media). 
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authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum.‖253  Similarly, the Court in 
Turner found that the sheer increase in available television and radio 
stations undermines any characterizations of cable media as being scarce.254  
The factual circumstances of today‘s broadcast media share more 
similarities with the Internet and cable than the scarce commodity of 
1978.255  
As broadcast media comes to resemble the Internet and cable 
television more, it becomes far less logical and justifiable to regulate 
broadcast more stringently than other media.256  The Court should have 
found the FCC‘s new policy arbitrary and capricious because it seeks to 
differentiate between broadcast media and other forms of media in a 
manner that is illogical and unjustifiable.257 
C. The Court Should Have Reviewed and Invalidated the FCC’s 
Enforcement Regime on Constitutional Grounds Because of Its 
Reliance on the Flawed Justifications of Pacifica and Red Lion 
Although the lower court‘s decision was decided on statutory grounds, 
the Court should have taken this opportunity to resolve the constitutional 
issues of this case by ruling that the outdated precedents of Red Lion and 
Pacifica can no longer provide the constitutional justification for the FCC‘s 
indecency regime.258  The Court clearly intended to focus solely on the 
issue of whether the FCC‘s change in policy passed the ―arbitrary and 
capricious‖ test rather than to examine any and all constitutional issues that 
necessarily exist when discussing the FCC‘s ability to regulate speech 
protected by the First Amendment.259
 
 The Court‘s disinterest in addressing 
the constitutional validity of policy might also be explained by the Court‘s 
reluctance to review the validity of Pacifica and its justifications without 
 
 253. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 254. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (suggesting that technology has increased the 
similarities between broadcast and other forms of media). 
 256. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of logic in regulating 
broadcast differently from other mediums). 
 257. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 258. See The Supreme Court 2008 Term––Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 352, 361–62 
(2009) (―At a minimum, in failing to evaluate the constitutional validity of the agency‘s position, 
the Court performed an incomplete review of the FCC‘s reasoning and permitted a constitutionally 
suspect—if not outright invalid—regulatory change.‖); see also Dave Hutchinson, Note, ―Fleeting 
Expletives‖ Are the Tip of the Iceberg: Fallout from Exposing the Arbitrary and Capricious 
Nature of Indecency Regulation, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 229, 249 (2008) (―[T]his case presents an 
opportunity for the Court to cut through the Gordian knot of indecency rhetoric . . . .‖). 
 259. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009) (―The Second 
Circuit did not definitively rule on the constitutionality of the Commission‘s orders . . . .  We see 
no reason to abandon our usual procedures in a rush to judgment without a lower court opinion.‖). 
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the input of the FCC or Congress.260  The Court, however, should have 
used this opportunity to address whether the change in factual 
circumstances in broadcast has impacted the validity of important 
precedents such as Pacifica.261   
In the years since Pacifica, the arguments of spectrum scarcity and the 
Pervasiveness Doctrine have come under significant attack as the number 
and variety of media outlets, both in broadcast and other mediums such as 
cable television, satellite radio, and the Internet have increased 
tremendously.262  The Court, however, did not see an immediate need to 
address the constitutional issues, believing that they would be addressed 
soon and that such interim harms would be insignificant.263
  
The Court‘s decision to narrowly review only the APA issue conflicts 
with the FCC‘s original petition for certiorari.264  The petitioners sought 
certiorari not only because of the Second Circuit‘s ruling on the APA issue, 
but also to resolve the Second Circuit‘s claim that the FCC could not 
―‗adequately respond to the constitutional . . . challenges‘‖ raised below.265  
Ironically, once certiorari was granted, the petitioners then argued that the 
Court could not consider these issues.266  As consideration of the 
 
 260. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984).  The Court 
observed: 
The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum scarcity has come 
under increasing criticism in recent years.  Critics, including the incumbent Chairman 
of the FCC, charge that with the advent of cable and satellite television technology, 
communities now have access to such a wide variety of stations that the scarcity 
doctrine is obsolete.  We are not prepared, however, to reconsider our longstanding 
approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological 
developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast 
regulation may be required. 
Id. (citation omitted).  
 261. See supra note 258 (criticizing the Supreme Court for not addressing the constitutional 
issues of the present case). 
 262. See supra Part V.B. 
 263. See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1819.  The Court explained: 
It is conceivable that the Commission‘s order may cause some broadcasters to avoid 
certain language that is beyond the Commission‘s reach under the Constitution.  
Whether that is so, and, if so, whether it is constitutional, will be determined soon 
enough, perhaps in this very case.  Meanwhile, any chilled references to excretory and 
sexual material ―surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern.‖ 
Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978)).  
 264. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582), 2007 WL 
3231567 (requesting certiorari on the constitutional question because the FCC was concerned that 
the Second Circuit, on remand, would invalidate its new policy on constitutional grounds). 
 265. Id.  
 266. Brief for the Petitioners at 43, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 2308909 
(―Consideration of respondents‘ constitutional arguments at this stage would be especially 
inappropriate in light of the rule that a ‗cross-petition is required . . . when the respondent seeks to 
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constitutional issues was at least a part of the petition for certiorari, the 
Court should consider those issues.267 
Although the Court usually seeks to avoid addressing constitutional 
issues when a case can be decided on statutory grounds,268 its refusal in the 
present case is an exercise in futility.269  This decision only delays the 
inevitable as the Second Circuit‘s dictum strongly suggests that since the 
Court was not persuaded by its decision to overrule the FCC‘s new policy 
on APA grounds, on remand, it will explicitly reject the new policy as 
unconstitutional.270
  
Justice Thomas all but acknowledged this outcome as 
well.271  The Court, however, has achieved a precise, conservative approach 
to upsetting precedent at the expense of clear and certain laws for 
broadcasters.272  In affirming the FCC‘s new policy, at least temporarily, 
without ensuring that the policy is constitutionally valid, the Court thereby 
unnecessarily creates uncertainty for both the FCC‘s enforcement regime 
and the broadcast networks.273   
As the petitioners noted, neither party can move beyond this case not 
knowing, for how long, this new policy will remain in place.274  In many 
cases, the Court‘s efforts to avoid constitutional issues and resolve a case on 
 
alter the judgment below.‘‖ (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 364 
(1994))). 
 267. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (criticizing the Supreme Court for not 
addressing the constitutional issues of the present case). 
 268. See supra Part II.D (discussing the Court‘s tradition, and recent upheaval thereof, of not 
resolving issues until a lower court passes judgment). 
 269. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582) (arguing that 
remanding on the constitutional question ―has an air of real futility‖ (comment of Ginsburg, J.)).  
 270. See HELGI C. WALKER & MARTHA E. HELLER, COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2009 317 (2009) 
(―After the Second Circuit analyzes the Commission‘s fleeting indecency policy using a First 
Amendment lens, the case likely will return to the Supreme Court.‖); see also Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009) (―[W]e are 
skeptical that the Commission can provide a reasoned explanation for its ‗fleeting expletive‘ 
regime that would pass constitutional muster.‖).  The Second Circuit also implied that the only 
reason it did not rule on the constitutional issues in this case was because the court had the 
opportunity and obligation to rule only on the APA issue.  Id. at 467 (―[B]ecause we can decide on 
this narrow ground, we vacate and remand so that the Commission can set forth that analysis.‖).  
 271. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (suggesting that the constitutional issues of the 
present case should be reviewed in the future). 
 272. See Andrew Smith, Comment, Out on a Limb Without Direction: How the Second 
Circuit’s Decision in Fox v. FCC Failed to Adequately Address Broadcast Indecency and Why the 
Supreme Court Must Correct the Confusion, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 383, 425 (2008) (―[I]f 
the Supreme Court fails to address these [constitutional] challenges, broadcasters will continue to 
question the FCC‘s authority, leading to an excess of Enforcement Bureau appeals and 
unnecessary future litigation.‖). 
 273. Id.  
 274. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (explaining that FCC requested certiorari 
because the agency was concerned that the Second Circuit, on remand, would invalidate its new 
policy on constitutional grounds). 
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statutory issues are commendable.  In the present case, the harms of leaving 
the FCC and broadcasters in the dark as to the future of the policy outweigh 
the Court‘s interest in restrained judicial action, particularly when a review 
of this case or a case very similar in the near future is likely.275 
In addition, the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC
276
 demonstrates the Court‘s ability to review constitutional issues 
when it could resolve the case on narrow grounds.  Although the Court has 
traditionally sought to avoid addressing constitutional issues not 
specifically raised by the lower court,277 Citizen United illustrates the 
Court‘s inclination to avoid this tradition when determining that it is 
necessary.278   
In the present case, the Court held tightly to the practice of avoiding 
constitutional issues not decided by the lower court,279 but in Citizens 
United the Court determined that this practice was inappropriate.280  
Although the Court provided multiple justifications for not abiding by this 
tradition, several of the reasons articulated are equally applicable to the 
instant case.  For instance, the Court relied on the fact that the lower court 
―passed‖ on the constitutional issue despite not specifically ruling on it.281  
Similarly, in the instant case, the Second Circuit passed on the 
constitutional validity of Pacifica and Red Lion.282  The Court also 
 
 275. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (explaining that the uncertainty regarding the 
constitutional validity of the FCC‘s new policy will create unnecessary litigation); see also Fox, 
489 F.3d at 462 (―[W]e are skeptical that the Commission can provide a reasoned explanation for 
its ‗fleeting expletive‘ regime that would pass constitutional muster.‖). 
 276. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 277. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing precedents in which the Supreme 
Court refrained from reaching a constitutional issue when statutory grounds were available). 
 278. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 932 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Essentially, five Justices 
were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give 
themselves an opportunity to change the law.‖).   
 279. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009) (―The Second 
Circuit did not definitively rule on the constitutionality of the Commission‘s orders . . . .  We see 
no reason to abandon our usual procedures in a rush to judgment without a lower court opinion.‖). 
 280. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892 (majority opinion) (―It is not judicial restraint to accept 
an unsound, narrow argument just so the Court can avoid another argument with broader 
implications.‖).  
 281. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing case precedent that enables the 
Supreme Court to decide on issues ―passed upon‖ by a lower court). 
 282. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 
1800 (2009).  The Court noted: 
[W]e refrain from deciding the various constitutional challenges . . . .  We note, 
however, that in reviewing these numerous constitutional challenges, which were fully 
briefed to this court and discussed at length during oral argument, we are skeptical that 
the Commission can provide a reasoned explanation for its ―fleeting expletive‖ regime 
that would pass constitutional muster.  
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determined that reviewing the constitutional issue would not involve a new 
claim because Citizens United had raised it in the lower court.283  In the 
instant case, parties challenging the new FCC policy initially raised a 
constitutional challenge in the lower court,284 and the FCC referred to the 
constitutional issues in its writ of certiorari.285  The Court in Citizens 
United also claimed that the conduct of the parties and the claims they 
brought to the lower court could not restrict the Court‘s ability to explore 
broader remedies,286 but this contradicts the Court‘s restrained approach in 
the present case.287  Furthermore, two of the equitable considerations relied 
upon in Citizens United—(1) the uncertainty of the law if the Court did not 
address the constitutional issue,288 and (2) the substantial amount of time 
and energy that would be wasted in further challenges to the law289—are 
also compelling considerations in the present case.290  Although the Court 
in the present case decided to stay within its tradition of avoiding 
constitutional issues, its decision in Citizens United reveals that this 
adherence to precedent was a function of its desire rather than its ability.291   
 
Id. (emphasis added).  The court recognized that its constitutional analysis was dicta, but hoped 
that it could ―clarify a complicated subject‖ and ―guide future courts to adopt fair and efficient 
procedures.‖  Id. at 426 n.12 (citation omitted).   
 283. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing precedent that allows the Supreme 
Court to review issues when they are raised earlier in a case even when they are not specifically 
decided upon by the lower court). 
 284. Brief of Petitioner CBS Broad., Inc. at 13, Fox, 489 F.3d 44 (No. 06-1760-ag(L)), 2006 
WL 4900577 (challenging the new FCC policy as contradicting the First Amendment principle of 
granting speakers ―‗breathing space‘‖). 
 285. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
1800 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2007 WL 3231567 (requesting certiorari because the FCC was 
concerned that the Second Circuit, on remand, would invalidate its new policy on constitutional 
grounds). 
 286. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 287. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1819 (refusing to review the constitutional issue because the Second 
Circuit did not definitively rule on it). 
 288. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the resulting legal uncertainty of 
the BCRA if the Court were to not reach the constitutional issue). 
 289.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial time and energy 
that would be poured into election speech litigation). 
 290. See Smith, supra note 272, at 425 (―[I]f the Supreme Court fails to address these 
[constitutional] challenges, broadcasters will continue to question the FCC‘s authority, leading to 
an excess of Enforcement Bureau appeals and unnecessary future litigation.‖); see also Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Fox, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (No. 07-582), 2007 WL 3231567 (requesting 
certiorari because the FCC was concerned that the Second Circuit, on remand, would invalidate its 
new policy on constitutional grounds). 
 291. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 932 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(―Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they 
changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.‖). 
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Had the Court decided to review the constitutionality of Pacifica, it 
should have ruled that the changes in factual circumstances undermine the 
case and justify a departure from its precedent and an invalidation of the 
FCC‘s enforcement regime.292  The original justifications for limiting First 
Amendment protections—spectrum scarcity, unique pervasiveness, and 
unique accessibility to children—no longer exist to the same degree as they 
existed in 1978 because of technological advancements, both with regard to 
broadcast media and other forms of media.293  The changing circumstances 
of broadcast media have undermined the constitutional foundations of the 
FCC enforcement regime.294  In his concurrence, Justice Thomas also 
concluded that analysis of Pacifica ought to lead to a departure from 
precedent.295
 
 Justice Breyer, in his dissent, also expressed a desire for a 
review of the constitutional issues in this case on remand.296  The Court 
should have reviewed the constitutional validity of Pacifica and Red Lion 
and ruled that the changed circumstances of broadcast cannot support the 
FCC‘s new enforcement regime.297 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In FCC v. Fox, the Supreme Court held that the FCC‘s new policy 
allowing sanctions on isolated and fleeting expletives was not arbitrary and 
capricious.298
 
 The Court, however, failed to require the FCC to provide a 
reasonable explanation of the need for changing policy after thirty years of 
finding isolated and fleeting expletives not actionable.299  Furthermore, the 
Court failed to address the FCC‘s unreasonable reliance on precedents such 
as Pacifica and Red Lion, cases based on the factual circumstances of 
 
 292. See May, supra note 246, at 376 (―Should the Court take on the constitutional issue, it 
would have an opportunity to rationalize its First Amendment jurisprudence in a way that would 
accord all the electronic media the same high level of free speech protection that the print media 
has always enjoyed.‖); see also supra note 244 and accompanying text (arguing that the Red Lion 
ruling should be overturned because the scarcity rationale is flawed). 
 293. See supra Part IV.B (discussing how technological advancements have undermined the 
scarcity, unique pervasiveness, and unique accessibility to children rationales).   
 294. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 295. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1822 (Thomas, J., concurring) (―These dramatic changes in factual 
circumstances might well support a departure from precedent under the prevailing approach to 
stare decisis.‖). 
 296. See id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (―And a remand here would do no more than ask 
the agency to reconsider its policy decision in light of the concerns raised in a judicial opinion. . . .  
I would not now foreclose, as the majority forecloses, our further consideration of this matter.‖).  
 297. See supra note 258 and accompanying text; see also Wallace, supra note 237, at 1 (―The 
Supreme Court should dispel this specter of censorship by rejecting the pervasiveness doctrine as 
a dangerously broad and vague excuse for speech regulation.‖). 
 298. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1812 (majority opinion). 
 299. See supra Part IV.A. 
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broadcast media in the 1970s that no longer apply to modern 
broadcasting.300
 
 Finally, the Court should have invalidated the FCC‘s 
enforcement regime because it relies on constitutional precedents that are 
no longer viable.301
 
 The Court‘s failure to address the disparity in 
regulatory stringency between broadcast media and other mediums merely 
delays the inevitable.  The Court‘s failure to fully address the dramatic 
changes in the factual circumstances surrounding broadcast media casts a 
dark and confusing shadow over the legitimacy and scope of the FCC‘s 
authority to regulate isolated and fleeting expletives.  Going forward, the 
FCC will warily exercise its new powers, unsure of their constitutional 
boundaries.  Broadcast networks will struggle to adjust to the FCC‘s new 
authority, which will likely lead to a ―chill‖ on live broadcast.  In the 
interim, both parties will become embroiled in timely and costly litigation 
that will one day force the Court to finally answer the questions and 
challenges it escaped in the present case. 
 
 
 300. See supra Part IV.B. 
 301. See supra Part IV.C. 
